Humanists are often
interested in the mind/body problem and wonder how our mental activities are
connected to brain activities.
Humanists are often also interested in alcohol and the effect that it
has on mental/brain activity. This
article brings both interests together to see what happens.
On Having One
Too Many
The striking
feature of having one too many (drinks, that is) is that you do not realise it
yourself. You think that you are still simply enjoying the euphoria which the
first couple of drinks brought you, whereas in fact you have long passed the
zenith and are now clearly (to everyone else) sliding down into drunken
incapacity. You are starting to slur your words and are becoming too assertive
and opinionated for comfort.
A few moments
previously you were in good spirits, literally, enjoying the banter and an
alcohol-induced frame of mind which could be called "heightened
sociability". In this state everyone at the table, yourself included,
seemed more than usually friendly and witty. Familiar little anecdotes from
everyday life provoked waves of merriment and you felt very much at home in the
group.
Such feelings
demonstrate the magical powers of alcohol. Undoubtedly it affects the chemistry
of the brain. In metaphorical terms, it was lubricating the brain/mental
processes and making everything run more smoothly. In more literal terms, the
alcohol was probably affecting the connections between neurons, making them
fire more easily and hence more widely, thereby causing the kind of lateral
thinking on which so much humour depends.
The reference to
causation in that last sentence picks out the key feature of the process of
drinking. The alcohol causes changes in behaviour and mental states. It gets
into the brain via the blood stream and it changes the whole person. And
therein lies its philosophical interest, in that drinking is a process which
straddles the divide between the public arena of bodily behaviour and the
private arena of mental states.
What you experience
is, initially, simply a feeling of well being. "It makes you feel
good" seems a fair description and it is certainly one that the drinks
advertisers have tried to exploit. "Feel good" is a way of saying
that you have changed, without going so far as to say that you are now a
different person. It is still the same you, but you are now "in a
different mood" is another way to describe it. Applying the word
"mood" has no explanatory force, however. It is not an explanation,
merely an assertion that these changes of mental state do not amount to a
change of personal identity. A euphoric, three-glass you is still you, but you
are in a better mood than usual.
Unfortunately, when
you are in a state of euphoria it is only too easy to think that having another
drink will prolong that agreeable situation. Rationally, and empirically, in
the cold light of day, you know that euphorias do not last and that having more
drinks is guaranteed to bring this one to an end. But you are in a state of
euphoria and such cautionary tales seem to you to be premature and pessimistic.
The logic of euphoria tells you that if two drinks have created your present
mood, then two more drinks will either intensify the feeling twofold, or make
it last twice as long, or perhaps even both.
So you have the two
extra drinks and you start to slur your words and to ramble your way
inconsequentially through stories for which either the punch-line has been
completely forgotten or, remembered, it seems a poor reward for a long-winded
narrative. It is at this point that the internal logic of euphoria begins to
fall out of step with the logic of external physical reality. For you, nothing
has changed, except that the merriment no longer seems as general as it was:
you are doing most of the laughing at the end of your own stories. But that can
be interpreted euphorically to mean merely that you appreciated the humour more
distinctly, or that you were in a better mood than everyone else.
To an external
observer, however, or to other members of your group who have not drunk quite
so much, the occurrence of slurred words and rambling stories with pathetic
punch-lines is evidence of a state of brain malfunction quite different from
that enjoyed earlier. What was a matter of degree has now become a matter of
distinct states. The change of quantity in the physical world (ie. the alcohol)
has produced a different kind of change in the mental world.
It is no good
saying that you are still the same person. Bodily, that is true, with the
exception of the additional alcohol now coursing through your veins. But the
person, in whose company others now feel trapped, is quite different: the
genial socialite is now a drunken bum. A change in mental state has occurred of
which you, the person undergoing the transformation, are quite unaware.
How is that
possible? How can mental states change without the knowledge of the mind
involved? It is tempting to say that brains are the key: we cannot see into our
own brains to see what state they are in, and even if we could, we would not
know what we were looking for. But brains are not necessarily the answer. Even
if we accept that a blood sample indicates the amount of alcohol in the brain
(a belief supported by police breathalyser teams), it is surely logically
possible for you to have your blood sampled and then say, "I do not
dispute the reading, but I am not drunk. I am only euphoric."
That answer is
logically coherent, but, as the police breathalyser team would say, it does not
prevent you from being wrong. You are not euphoric; you are drunk. The evidence
is available to all: you slur your words, you think inane remarks are
uproariously funny and you have a tendency to fall over. Your insistence on a
fundamental dualism of mind and body such that the mind is unaffected by bodily
chemistry is clearly further evidence of your impaired reasoning. Dualism has
failed to do justice to the situation. The evidence lies in your behaviour and
therefore a physicalist account of mental states in terms of bodily actions
must lie closer to the truth.
Has the person been
dissolved then? No, only a part of your brain. That desperate assertion,
"I am only euphoric," is mistaken, not only about the euphoria, but
also about the self making the mistake. Is there an "I" to which the
drunken incapacity is happening? Is there some still point in the vortex of
swirling impressions and sensations? Can the real you please stand up? Of
course not. You are drunk and your drunkenness consists of slurring words,
staggering around, falling over furniture, etc. And that is all. What more
could there be? A kernel of self which soars above all that shambles? A little
sober bit in the midst of all that incoherent speech and mindless mirth?
In the words of the
police breathalyser team, pull the other one. There is no little sober bit. You
are drunk through and through. You are soaked. Plastered. You think you are
still the same self as before but you are in no fit state to pass any judgment.
Tomorrow when you see that ashen face in the mirror and try vainly to remember
what happened, then you will know that you were not yourself and that the
illusion of continuity of identity was only that – an illusion. You were those
disconnected words, raucous laughs and inaccurate movements, but now in the
cold light of day you disown them, and accept that the present headachy,
nauseous and irritable self is the next stage in the series of you.
Or so you should,
but old habits die hard, and so you cling to the discredited illusions of
continuous identity. "What a fool I made of myself last night!" you
say ruefully. But that heroic acceptance of responsibility does not prevent you
from blaming the excess alcohol. The drink got the better of you. It caused you
to act as you did. It gave the orders and you, in a state of diminished
responsibility, carried them out. So you say, "What a fool the drink made
of me last night!" And the truth of the matter lies in the connection
between those two exclamations, which you in the haggard chill of the morning
are reluctant to contemplate.
Les Reid
(is continuing his
research into alcohol, mental states and personal identity. Any person or
institution interested in funding this important work should contact him via
the Editor.)
This article first
appeared in Philosophy Now.